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1. A delegation of the Commission headed by Sir C Soames 
and comprising amongst other officials Messrs. Hijzen, Rabot, 
Spaak and Grierson was in Washington from 29 to 31 October 1973 
for the 7th round of the periodical high level consultations 
with the US Administration. The US delegation was lead by William 
J. Casey, Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. 
2. Attached are the records of the plenary meetings (Annex 
1), together with records of separate discussions held by indi-
vidual members of Sir C Soames' delegation with their opposite 
numbers on the US side (Annex 2). 
3. Discussions of a general political character (e.g. on 
the Year of Europe, on overall EC-US relations, etc.) are for 
the most part not recorded. 
4. All the records are for internal Commission use only. 
They may not be divulged to third parties, or to the press • 
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I. Industrial Policy 
1. Discuss 1ion was of a general character, covering the Commission's 
philosophy rather than the detail of specific initiatives. 
2. Messrs Case;,r and Armstrong wanted to learn more about the Com-
muni ty1 s positipn on public procurement, sectoral policies, competition 
policy, state alid policy, multinational coqipani~s, product standardisa-
tion, product certification, industrial property and investment policy. 
3. On public procurement, they emphasized the importance that they 
attached to the development by the Cormmmity of an internationally 
acceptable poli,cy which should be ready for negotiation within the frame-
work and timetable of the forthcoming multilateral trade negotiations. 
Without this, there could be little progress on 1UB 1 s. Sir C Soames. and. 
Mr Grierson sai~ that the opening-up of public procurement for intra-
Community trade was under study and would in practice be beneficial to 
non-Communi ty-basecl companies 'l'Ji th subsldiaries within the Community. 
The Community had not yet, however, an internally accepted procurement 
policy, let alone an international negotiating position. The Corrmr.mi ty 
was nevertheless prepared to play an active role in the MI'N; and would 
seek an appropriate mandate from the Council. In this context, the Com-
mission Wern in the process of setting up a study group of three experts 
to consider the practical rather than legal aspects of Community procure-
ment and it was. agreed that their terms of reference would, if possible, 
be extended to take account of international aspects too. US represen-
tatives could cpme to Europe to talk to the experts in the course of 
their study. 
4. Mr Grierson expressed concern at the practices of certain US 
states in overriding federal procurement practices i-;i th their own discri-
minatory policy. Messrs Armstrong and Morris confirmed that the U .s. 
would try to pass binding legislation in this field and that this would 
be greatly facilitated in the context of an internationally negotiated 
agreement. The Conm1ission delegation took note of the US position. 
5. Regard:Lng sectoral policies, Mr Casey wanted to know which sectors 
were currently µnder review and what would be the effect for the U.S. 
when these policies came into effect. Mr Grierson answered that sectoral 
policies for a~ronautics, computers, shipbuilding and pulp and paper would 
shortly be or qad already been proposed to the Council and that an initia-
tive in the field of textiles would follow. These policies were primarily 
designed to coordinate at a Community level already existing national 
policies and the U.S. should have no reason to fear any radical departure 
from the Community's tra~itionally liberal approach. 
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6. Regarding cornpeti tion policy, Mem,rs Armstrong and Fox askul 
whether the Commission would consider i t--;rorthwhile to bring the com;,e-
ti tion Directorate General into regular consultation with the US Anti-
'rrust authorities. It was subsequently agreed not to place "anti-trust" 
explicitly in the us/commission agenda in order not to attract too much 
outside attention; but to discuss the problem under the heading of 
industrial poli~y. ("We have to bring people in without advertising it.") 
7. Regardir,.g state aid, Messrs Fox and Morris wished to know whether, 
in the context of MIT negotiations on llTB-'s, the Community would put 
together a"'package" including formal limits on its a,ids. 1".tr Grierson 
affirmed that tle present si. tuation under the Treaty was that aid.s were 
genera.Hy regar ed as incompatible with the Common Market, but made no 
commitment to s tting up a "package" includii-ig state aids. 
8. Regarding m1-1.ltinational companies, Mr Grierson explained the 
present strd~us of the preparation of the Commission's document, which 
would shortly be presented to the Council for discussion .. There was no 
intention to linht the legitimate activities of multinationals or to 
discriminate agd.inst those of non-Communi tJ' origin. 
9. Regarding prod01.ct standardisation and certification, Mr Kelly 
stated that the US were in favour of harmonisation at a Community levsl, 
as this m2ant that nine standards would be replaced by one. This should 
not be made into a weapon for use against US products. The U.S. w0re 
also concerned about the problem of the compatibility of Community and 
US standards I partic11larly with respect to the motor industry and wine 
products. 1I'hey would like to be consulted during the drawing up of such 
standards. rrhey also hoped to see the drawing up of a general "code" 
agreement ~m prClduct standards (quality insurance system) before the end 
of the multilateral trade negotiations on the basis of mutual recognition 
of nationc1l star:idards. The Commission representatives took note of their 
comments and agr!eed to look further into them. They also were open to 
receiving more details of US complaints. 
10. Regarding industrial property, Mr Kelly asked about the work that 
the Commission was engaged upon in this field and proposed that the sub-
ject should be included in the next round of discussions. The CoITL~ission 
representatives agreed. 
11. Regarding investment policy, Mr Korp referred to the work being 
done in the framework of OECD and expressed the hope that a mechanism 
could be established for interchanging views with the Community at 
regular intervals. The Commission representatives agreed to consider 
this. 
II. Energy Policy 
12. The main points of discussion were: 
1. The Community's priority action programme 
! 
2. The present oil supply crisis. 
13, Mr Spaak! outlined the three main features of the Community• s 
priority action programme: 
... I ... 
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(a) Cooperation amongst the main consumer countries 
(i) the avoidance of outbidding for crude oil (e.g. through 
a system of agreed reference prices); 
(ii) research and development 
to be tackled early next year; 
(iii) crisis management 
the Cormnunity had insisted on the urgency of an 
allocation system. 
(b) Rc~lttions with producer countries 
to lllr'.lintain producer countries' interest in keeping 
production going. 
(c) Establishment of a common energy market. 
14. On the ]Present oil supply crisis 1 Mr Spaak made the following 
points: 
- The situation of the EC was worse than the US situation, as the U.S. 
im9orted only J.2% of their oil needs, whereas the EC imported nearly 
lOOfa of its oil needs; this represented 60% of total EC energy 
requirements. 
- The U.S. used more than 50;s of their oil for transportation; the 
EC used more than 50% for industrial fuelling and electric power 
production. 
Our Member States had tried to deal with these problems separately, 
for instanceiby imposing export licensing systems. The Commission 
proposed to 1·eplace the national systems by an immediate information 
system about movement within the Community. 
15. Mr Casey said that Europe appeared to be reluctant to share oil 
supplies with the U.S. for fear of adverse reaction from the Arabs. 
Producer dictation was clearly here to stay; the need in the West was 
to develop new $Ources of energy and to try to reduce consumption. 
16. M:r Juli1,ts Katz argued that outbidding ,,~as no longer the immediate 
issue; supply d.ecJ.ine was of much more direct concern. He and Mr Di Bona 
questioned the ~sefulness both of reference prices (which the U.S. had 
also considered) and of joint action by consumer countries. "'I'he more the 
consumer nationf squabble together, the more the producer nations are 
strengthened in·their position." On Mr Spaak's figures, Mr Katz said 
that it would be more correct to state that 70% of the US oil consumption 
was destined for industrial purposes. The first impact of the oil short-
age on the US economy had been generally the same as on the EC economy. 
The U.S. was not better o:ff - American social and agricultural· patterns · 
were built rouni the extensive use of energy and cut-backs would be very 
painful. Of tht lost two million barrels a day, only one-quarter could 
be made up from:other sources - e.g. from coal or from domestic wells 
which were opercli,ting at less than capacity. There would be new energy 
resources (e.g. I oil shale) in the longer run; but research and development 
would not yield:results before 1980 in any significant degree • 
. . . / ... 
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that high pricos of 1t8 - 1;:;10 a barrel would in 
consum1Jtion and encourage the exploitation of 
But this proc0ss coul(i. take at least five years 
of supply and dem:i.nd. 
18. Mr Kat~!went on to say that we were all faced with the alter-
natives of eithir paying very high prices in the shorter and medium terms 
or of cutting back imports substantially. The latter was the better 
collective cour,te. He asked whether j_t was possible to limit EC imports 
and to allocate shares to member countries. Mr S-oaak answered that the 
----·--first priority W?.s to avoid any spectacular action, and to concentrate 
on getting as m~~ch oil off the Arabs as poosible. It was better to 
practice politi6al solidarity, and not to talk about it. 
19. Sir C S())ames askecl whether the US side wanted to add to or subtr2ct 
from the Conimu.nl t;r' s action programme as outlined b,y Mr Spaak; and did 
the U.S. see an;r areas 1,ihich were suitable for EC/u.s. cooperation to 
face the present crisis? Mr Cn.se;y replied that he had no further comment, 
on Mr Spaak 1 s 01~tline. On research and develop:nent, the U.S. were re:::.d.;y 
to identify areas for cooperation. It was hard to see what else could_ be 
included at the present time. 
III, Trade Polic~ Issues 
A, Relations wtth the LDC 1 s 
20. Sir C S?ames pointed out that the reversed. preference problem 
still remained 1,1nresolved in the Protocol 22 negotiations. The Com.'11iss:i.on 
would be ready to discuss the matter further with the U.S. at a later 
stage ("before things become frozen"). Messrs Casey and F.berle emphasized 
the importance of these questions and asked for consultations at an early 
date. It was agreed to arrange a meeting through Ambassador Greemw,ld. 
at a time when Protocol 22 negotiations had become clearer (probably 
early next year). 
21. Discussion then turned to the Asian countries (Joint Declaration 
of Intent on the development of trade relations with Ceylon, India, 
Malaysia, Pakistan and Singapore in the Treaty of Accession). Sir C Soames 
said that there I were problems for certain commodities (e.g. jute, ply1,rood, 
tobacco) which would lose free access to the British market. The }:C had. 
not so far committed itself to any specific course. For 1974, the EC 
would undertake a bridging operation in the framework of the GPS. In the 
long run, these problems should be resolved in the multilateral trade 
negotiations. Mr Eberle commented that tobacco was of ma.ior concern for 
the U.S. and that "it could be harmful to create additional irritations". 
22. Mr Eberle then raised in more general terms the LDC 1 s participation 
in the multilatf:)ral trade negotiations. He suggested early consultations 
to find out whaJt; LDC 1 s exactly want. Sir C Soames stressed the Communi t;r' s 
interest in the:us efforts to implement the GPS. Mr Eberle explainE:d 
that it would nbed a year after approval of the Trade Bill and could not 
be expected to ~.ork before the early part of 1975. 
. .. I ... 
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B. Reh:.bons wiith Je.nan 
23. I,1er;:c:rs Casc;v Etnd ·sterle said that US-J2.~2.-YJ.ese ·crade relations 
had improved consid.e~t~ci,bl;r and that the trade t2irnce now looked more 
favourablo on most fronts. There were nevertheless still four issues 
which nee:d.ed. fu:rther effort on the ,Tapci.nese side: import quotas, libe-
ralisation of investm-:.mt poli.c3r (administrath·,2 "guicl2nces"), government 
procurement, and. imports of agricnl tural proiucts. In ac1cli tion to th:i.s, 
an internation2~lly ,mpervised safeguard s,yster:1 h::-«s to be discussed. 
~~r C S0Eu:10s said that the Comm.1.ni ty had nmr tc:,ken over a large p2.rt of 
Japanese ozportJ:, and that our tra.de balance with Jap2,n showed a siibstantial 
deficit. 'I'here! was, nevertheless, room for considerable expansion of 
EC-Japanese trade. But the mistakes of the past should not be rep,2ated: 
t:cade had to be broadly· balanced and Japar:ese exports should not conc,:on-
trate on ps.rticular sectors. Mr I<~berle explain()d that the U.S. did. not 
aim to balance trade 11ith every tracle partner, b:~t that the imbals.ncs in 
US-Japane[,e trade had groim to an extent Ur;.t it had affected the multi-
lateral US trade position. 
C. Relations with Eastorn J:furopean countries 
2fi. Sir C Soo.mes said that the Commiss:i.on had no illusions: the 
Russian motive in the Comecon 1 s approach to the Community was to get 
control over the Cornrmmity' s relations with the individual Eastern 
European countries. There was an internal :SC problem with respect to 
I 
cooperation agreements. rrhe Commission hai p:co:9osed to coordinate the 
activities of l\fomber States. The Russians had 2,lready agreed to an EC 
clause in the German-Hussian deal. rrhe Rournani2.n bid for GPS was poli-
tically sig~1ificant. 
D. US Trade Bill 
25. Mr Pearbe gave an optimistic account of the Bill's progress. It 
was a good. Billin its present form. The so-called Vanik Amendment, which 
had attracted. a great deal of Ho'J.se support, aimed, however, at amonding 
the Bill to make the granting of export-import bank credits to the Soviet 
Union also cont11nee11t on free emigration policies. To avoid delaying 
the Bill mw further, the Administration was now rnady to drop Title IV 
(M:F'H treatment for State Trading companies). Parado:dcally, the reason 
for its original inclusion had been to broaden the support of the 'l1rade 
Bill as a whole. Mr Pearce said that the next tNo weeks would be crucial; 
but the chances were good that a satisfactory Trade Bill would become law 
b;y March 1974. The successful struggle against domestic inflation arnl 
the improvem:mt of the trade balance: both work in favour of this. 
26. Sir C Soames pointed out that the enactment of the Bill had initi-
ally been expected for September this year. Our timing depended. very 
much on the US timing. Both sic.los nmst ke•.?P in step. The problem for 
the i.nterim period is to maintain the momentum in Geneva; doing nothing 
we.f: ! ·,.rder than doing something. 
27. In vie .. , of the fact that the Community had had the opportunity 
to c,Y::ment on the Trade liill, :Mr Eberle asked for informal discussions 
in t}:e int~J'im period on how the Community envisaged translating the 
general approach into negotiation directives. Sir C Soames answered 
that the Trade Bill was the equivalent of the Community's global approach 
and that such cpnsultations would in fact be anticipated negotiations. 
I 
I 
... I ... 
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E . Multilateml Trao0 Woeoti2.tions (Hr!D_ 
28. Kr ;i;berlc said that analytical and prepara,toJ:·y work had to be 
done "without prence,otiatio:nsn. As to tbe question ho,, to organise this 
in Geneva (r:::'rado I'Tegotia·i;ions Committee), the bc.tll 1-ras in the Cor@mnity's 
court. Hr H~os~~ expressed doubts whether existing rules, for example 
in G.A:rT, or in the Committee of the 20, Hero still aflpropriate. 1,;r Hi i::.:811 said 
that it would be bctte:::· to wail; and see whether any changes were--:G1 ' 
practice needed, rather than to promote tlrnoretical changes in advance. 
29. Mr Ccwey said that the US Administration were re--examining their 
existing co11.cepts in preparation for the 1·:orld 1<1ood Conference to be held 
next ye2r. They vmnted to engoe;e in "brain stormingn, both bilater2.lly 
with the Cormnission and with othern, and multilaterally in the m::c-o. rrhe 
U.S. saw no conflict or overlap between the proposed Conference and tne 
multilater2J. trade negotiations. rrhe former uould provide the fromework 
in which c:. broad international exchange of viGws might take place on the 
world's future food supplies ancl how to improve them. rl'he MI'N ivou.ld 
de2,l with specific matters which called for precise negotiation, e. g. 
stock-piling and the avoid.o,nce of traclc distortions in agricul tnral pro-
ducts. 
30. Mr Casey then expounded the US proposal for a study of the world. 
food sitmd;ion b;y a group of independent experts in the O]~CD frame~·JO:rk, 
who would. 1 among other things, look at long-term policy alternatives. 
Mr Hijzen said that he found this proposal worr;ying. It would serve to 
freeze the positions of different governments. I,ioreover, reall;y inde-
pendent experts in this field simply did not exist. Sir C Soamas asked 
that the Commission should have time to think about the proposal. 
31. Mr Goodman foresaw a greatly eased world situation for foed grains; 
despite lm·r fish catches and high Soviet purclnses, th.e U. s. would have 
240 million bushels of soybeans carry-.over from the present crop. Mr Jabot, 
welcoming this statement, said that the Corri_m•_mity would try to increase 
its 01,,n-1 protein production and would have a soybean crop of perlm_ps 
100 OOO tons per ammm in two or three years time. A deficiency payments 
system vmuld be used to encourage this crop, which needed special soil, 
humidity and sunshine. He expected that the Communit;y would contirnie to 
import soybeans at the present level from the United States. 
EF~A Rules of Origin 
32. In response to expressions of American concern, Sir C Soames 
said that the Commission would stand by their offer of last summer, namely 
to look at individual cases of possible hardship to US exporters. 
Mr Hijzen said that the Commission would do so without co1mni tment to any 
new theory of protection which the US side might now be wishing to put 
forward. 
. .. I .. . 
- 7 -
33, l\~:c r<;":JerJ c said tlw:t r,,.r0:rcorncnt Haf:'. neeclod in GencvQ. by the e:od. 
--------- '-
of the yec:1,r; and_ th;:-it ncg-oti~"tionr:: sho:_1_1(1 therefo:c2 l)e starteci ,:,,s 2,c:rly 
as :possible in l'i;o,1enb2:r.·. Ee cxpJ.ain-2d that this l1ud bGon the und.e:rstsnci-
ing 11hich the Jl,dm:inic~Tat:i.on h2,cl rc&chcc1 1:;jth US industry; any cli:GiX-ige 
would b::: eml)arra~:sinci;·. lilr Fj_j:o3cm sr,id. thc:d; the Co;r@j_s:::ion agree,rl t~:CLt 
it u2,s :i rn)ortant to tr;y- to get this matter out of the Fay before the 
Ml1IJ st,,rted to get dD1:n to bm,incrrn. 
34, The US side expressed sou:e doLJ.btr,; 2,bout the ad.equacy of the anti-
cipatecl Co111m.mi t;y offer; but there w2.s no suoctantive discussion 1 the 
Commission siuc pointing out thi:',t the Co,mcil of I.J:iriistsrs had not ;yet 
reached a finsJ. decision on wh0.t the offer slrnu.ld be. 
J:'errou~ Sg_rap 
35. J>ir Hi izen rchearned the difficulties ,fr1ich thif, :year's US ex,)ort 
embargo iliJ.lT·c.~~usc,-d. the Cormnuni.t;t,, 1 and stu.ted the CoTmuni\y' s ea.so for 
advance consultation bofore the m, Administration decided whether to 
maintaj_n I'<')t'itrictiorrn on exports of fer:r.·0 1ls scrap in 197 4. It w,;;.,, ,.:.greed 
that a furthsr rouml of consultc::tiorrn should. take place for this purpose 
in mid-Hovernber. 
Semi-con:iiJ.ctors 
36. Vi1::___g&sey said that the US Administr2,tion continued to be worried 
by the rates of duty which member goverfl""l::nts i,.,mre no~J applying to im;iorts 
of semi-conductors from the U.S. 'rhe A(bi.nistration would shortly be 
addressing a legal memorandum on the subject to the Commission • 
. Lli'/GB/ma~ 
·William J. CaGcy 
1}illis C. /irrn3tr011ts 
George S. Springsteen 
JofJeph !~. Greenwald 
J u.l i 11s L. }< .::1 .. t z 
John C. Hcnner 
Anthony Al iJJ:echt 
Derartmcr,t _ or_ t}w fPrca.nUJ'Y 
John :.1. Hcnne1:isy 
Howard 1,!ol'thington 
i'Stirray· n.(ys D 
Ifos·h i-lcI'i:.i..c:Lcl2n 
Lauwrence A. Ii'ox 
Forrest Ahbuhl 
Dcpc.rtment of A,g_ricultu:re 
Carroll G. :Ci0 ux1thaver 
David }·lurne 
Richard J. Goocman 
Gordon O. Fraser 
De_partm~:d;. of Lab'?!: 
Herbert IJ. Blackms.n 
Ha.tional ~1ecnri t;y CoD . nci 1 
Helmut Scnmenfeldt 
CharleD Cooper 
S'rH 
Hilliam Eberle 
IJilliar:i Pearce 
Harold Ealmgren 
Herbert Propps 
CIEP 
Deane R. Hinton 
Jtobert I-Iorris 
Council of Economic .Advisers 
Nr. Stein 
Gary Seevers 
Q,pecial Consnlta.nt to the Presid0.nt 
Charl(~s DiBona 
C . . cr::ffil Es 1 o:n 
D. G. I 
Theodoru:; Hijzen 
Leslie Fielding 
Gfu1ter Tlurghc,,rdt 
D. r:;. III 
Eonald Orie:cson 
JJ. G. VI 
GGorges B.a1)ot 
D. G. XVII 
:J?crnantl Spa.::ck 
David Ifan.,'1ay 
Richard Hay 
·A. Er, Hijzen's meeting with FerJsrs. Vialmgren, 
Iformer and others. 
B. Er. Un.bot 's meetings with Mr. Brunthaver and 
liesGrs. Julius and. Abe Katz. 
Those Dr8scn t: 
Hr Hijzen 
Nr Vi o 1 d inc: 
I,Tr Loerkc: 
Ambassa,d_,;r Malmgren 
Mr Eemier 
Mr Albrecht 
Ambo,ss,:oor Green;,iald 
(Amb~ssador Eborlf at 
the close) 
1. Mr _ _Ticnner expressed US concern at the effect of the Communi t;y' s 
ruler:, on US exports to EF'l1A countries, \Tith pc-:.rticular reference to 
car ru1d electronic components. The US Administration needed, for 
political reasons, to be seen to be engar;ed in discussion of the :rules 
with th8 Commission, ,mc:L to be able to raise individ"J.o,l border lino 
cases. K!:_..Qr~-~:"'' l~ ::1\;,ggested that, if the foregoing· Hould be di:f':fi-
cul t for !;he Communit;y Kember r-;ta tes, inform:c,.J. talks might nevertheless 
take place between the US Mission and the Commission. r.:r Hijzon e.grGed 
to pursue t11.is question further in Brussels with Mr Greenwald. 
Textiles 
2. Mr J.hlmgrGn expressed concern at the delay in establishing a 
Community mand.2:i;c, 2cnd at reports that the Commission might not be 
able to e11ter into substantive Yiegotiations until as late as F'ebruar;y. 
JiTr Hijzen assured him that the Commission's firm aim was to reach a 
satisfactory settlement before the end of the yeE~r. 
T. H. C. 
3, Mr Hijzen cleared up US misunderstandings on the attitude adopted 
by the Commission in Geneva towards Mr Lang's compromise proposals to 
deal with the problem of Comrni ttce structure. '11 he Corrnnission had said 
neither ;yes nor no to the Chairman's proposal; and hoped that, if the 
Chairman uent ahead to convene a meeting in the second half of the month, 
the Commission would be authorised b;r the Member States to attend. 
World },ood Conference 
4. Mr :Malmgren explained US thinking on the link between the proposed 
World li'ood Conference and the G.AT'l', by referring to his statement at 
Geneva of 26 October. The US hope was that this Conference would permit 
a general exchange of ideas and the evolution of broad lines of guidance; 
but that the negotiation and conclusion of actual aereements would be 
the exclusive task of the GAT'l1. 
. .. I ... 
2 
5. Mr 1I:i.~en expresf~ecl_ the Con~~nission 1 s se:c10:1s concern at recen"~ 
instances in which the US authorities had failed to respect the code of 
conduct on anti-d.umping procedures. He cited in ;,articular the u~; 
habit of initiating ant:i.-cb.mping proceed.ings ,·,i-thcY,lt first 2,scertaining 
that there was a case to answer; 2.~-,.J of allo1-;ing claims of j_njur~0 ti:2,t 
1H:r0 \'Cl{.}.lC 2x1d indirect. }}e left ::.n. lGicfficic .. l !;c:;1t de p:-~pier su;:1rrJ~rj_~-
ir~.g t1'1e Corum.issio11 1 s are·umonts. ll!~_Pc~:92r cg·re~;ci to look j_:lto tnis 
com;-ilaint. 
6. Mr Eberle, arriying late, rer.ec:ea. earlisr US com~>laints of a 
s;ysternatic la.ck, or uithdr2,·.,ral, of Ccr:i:;11.mity coo;J-2ration in vario~1s 
trade matters. It was explained to hira that these had alre2..dJ been 
dealt \·!i tr1 po:~nt b~y point. }!r I{i.jzC:=11 £:2 .. id that t!iere \·Ja.s no justific2,-
tion for us conc•Jrn1 which sp-;(J.ng from ,0• series of misundcrstn.lldings • 
LF/map 
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---------·- ,-·--------------·--· ·--- - ---------------------
La part :le a1:rcic ol e de~: f_:nt re t :Len~, q..,_,Jj_ DY; t eu 1 J '::'U 
au. cOllrs de :La \Tj_si·te (!_,_~-: Sir· C1'1r·:l stc)TJ!.·:~:?I' ~3ocut;_,.:;s 
'"'e 1·-/oc,,;vvc, 'a 1·,,,:, CQ"n"("l'O' ·i ,. C',~-n,-, ,., ~-I •'tn·<'-,-- >",1·,,,ry1·i-l-r-:, C' • 
.._. _ \s., ,_, v .. J.,_,._.,:, .,,, ,1c;., l .L-.!.1 .. ) . . , • .1 ,., • .,. l.l,,__,_ ~--- _., r.. 1_ • .,. ,.,'_/.s. __ l .... -'--- ·-· . _ l; .,_ l_. 1_,. 
- cell:~ cue \lonsieur ot o. e 1.,ir::: ,-i"I(~C :iz, f.ou:o,-
c)•r.,c y•/,·!·a-'-l. ·1-~("' "[)1~,,ntl---,a·,,n '1·'. 
~- I.:.., - \.....> V . . _.. • _.J V-... l _.. V ..-,, . . ~ 
- cell.t=: quc 1fossicurs f:;J-!)ot Pt ILLh'en ont eue 
avec Julius et Abe K8tz. 
Au cours du premier entr,,ticn, r: ':=:;_,t r:"::'.':;ntir,,JJcuent 
1 ,.,, , ,.:J ' ·- 't . '!' ,. ,, e pro; l .i. e me r l C' S ac CO :C' u ~: Ci. e p :CO J !) :1 _. -- ,; rl 1J l. cc' e.:, C (J 1 ,3 CU c: C: 
et en pa.rt:l.culjer le;::; c1U'f'erents f:,12rEents 0 1,li pou:n'aLent 
entrer daru; ces accor,~h,. 
Brunthaver en a ment:i onn& qua.tre sur 1esque1s son 
attitude serait positive: 
des consulta.tj_ons rec:iproques 
- une politique de sto~kage 
- l 'aide ali1aentai re 
- une disc:~pline en 1uJtiere de 1·2c3ti tut ion et de 
subsides a:11x. exportations. 
En revanche, sur la question d'a~cord sur le niveau 
des prix, la position ar.16ricaine n2 sen:ble pas ·avcd.r 
evoJ.ue. 
·t .L ' 'f' ,,, 1 1 ' l 1 • ·1··L· Un SUJC' - P- U'3 speci ·1crtk a e,~e O.,J()}'i".,c.:: __ r::::: (;LjfJ()l]l")J. ]-
tes amcrica:i.ncs en so.ja pour L,. c,11:q)·~r·;tH~ r,roeh:-dnc . 
. . / .. 
J'.u cours de: 
1. la prep:'1:!.'r:1tion de ~jJ' con:~·[,:cence n,cnc1:ie1e 
p<:t1'"1 le ~:ec1~8tg_,J..re ;"l ~ t:i:at -(:L~;r~:Lr1,~~r:J·; 
2. l 'ut:ili.t·S di3 reux_1_:'._--~n·; 2e 1 er1c::nt cltns Je c,3'.Jr,~ d,"' 
1 1 0.C . .1).}:. SUl"' J,q -J;_:::~.J:.r1d·~; 1jt le:~ r~:sr_:.()lJ.'f'r:r.-:.) clr: 
produits agricoles; 
3. 1a propCJsJtion 3-:;·/;·~r·s.in,, c-l'f:Ln1J]:1r dan;; le'. cc1dre 
~e + f O' C • ] ) ~ ::~~. U.1J f~~~.0~3pe t~ r? ·L ~('CJ './Tt} l_ rJ re ...-.~pt~ r·I_- ~~ ' 
Jnderiericl,J]l'(,Q dr-1•.,.,,--r_ oc·p]_11tor Jr:.,c. pr:,·,"c•-,,pct,,;o•; ') lon[t t;,1:;r~,~ ~n ;;~ti::~1_~; · d~ "\~e:c:~;,~;r~~;;:~~-1'., cl;· ;(,r;~ilh' 
agricolcs. 
Bien que Jul:i.us Katz 01:i.::- la! sse entf,1Ei:tc C'.U 'un rro:jet 
d' ordre du jour pou:c :! Et conf'(r~!nce mcr2J Lale s:?\'c,:i. t 
pr'et rapide:ncnt, j_l 11-s ~c~c11.JJe pa.!:.~ oue cr';Ja ~;o·L1: eri.cc:rA 
l o C<:-,S e.,_ J)''ll' co-1~?:.:r·-.,-·r,1- 1~1 c1 n°r~i--:··~--,,·) ~ 1 'r ........ r.!r\,.,l·1·1J"'C • ~ Cl l,) ,_,. 1.,J ~; -~'-• ·__;, ., :_., __ ,, •-'~-- .. t. ,.c! _, .!. '--· ,J. ~ }\!_',~ J_,_ <( (., ·-'- • 
Butz ne sera vre.iserrC:J:,.s·olemcnt r;ci.s en ete.t cle :f'air,2 :::les 
·nr·opo 0 i· ·c·-i· or1'~ 'a ce c::uJ·""-:- ::iu c·,ur-:- rl0 1~, -r·p;r1·1· or' ,,,::, ·1 " 
_l- . c, • 0 • ,.. ., .• .-. , -.) .. , .. , .A~ .• . _ -- -.! _ .. l '-' -- .L ,_I_ 
F.A.0. a Ro:nr;, Les Cll''Y3SS C''Jt suff:j,_,cil!;li'.ent 8-.7~::ncc 
c ependant pour que lo:cs 5e se rcnc:ont i-e 8.\"::C :Ions .i.eur 
Lardinois le 15 nove/c,:,"e a T:ru:-~t:>1les i1 puL-.,s2 lui 
en donner 1es grand.es ligne3. 
En ce qui concerne la C!_'eat:Lcn d 1un gro' .. lJ"=' d · exp0.rts 
j_ndependan t s clans le ;"; D 11 re d '., 1' r). C . D. E. , n1J_r:un(~ c enc lu--
~; :Lon n'a ete atteintP }O:!"S 1.ks re.un:ion:; ~') ;'Ja::J,1n[~l·,on, 
mais il a {;t(; clair q'E: la C:onr:1Ir:!-.~-1or1 m~(.rquatt t,D. 
rctj_cence. 
